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Bilski: Assessing the Impact of a Newly Invigorated Patent-Eligibility
Doctrine on the Pharmaceutical Industry and the Future of Personalized
Medicine
Christopher M. Holman*
Associate Professor of Law, University of Missouri, Kansas City School of Law
Abstract: The patent-eligibility doctrine serves a gatekeeper role in excluding from patent protection natural phenomena,
principles of nature, abstract ideas, and mental processes. Beginning around 1980, the U.S. patent system embarked upon
a pronounced expansion in its definition of patent-eligible subject matter, particularly with respect to software and business method inventions, but also in the life sciences. In recent years, however, we have seen a backlash, with many critics
from the public and private sectors arguing that the threshold for patent-eligibility needs to be raised in order to ensure
that patents fulfill their constitutional objective of encouraging innovation rather than impeding it. The courts and PTO
appear to have heard these critics, and have begun to actively rein in the scope of patent-eligible subject matter. This shift
in the swing of the patent-eligibility pendulum will likely have a profound impact on the patentability of innovations arising out of the pharmaceutical and biotechnology industries, particularly those relating to diagnostics and personalized
medicine. In this article, I discuss the current status of the patent-eligibility doctrine, how it is that we got here, and what
the future might hold, particularly for the life science industries.

Keywords: Chakrabarty, LabCorp, Metabolite, Prometheus, Classen, Ariad, thiopurine, fundamental principle, machine or
transformation test, Patents, Bilski, patent eligibility, patentable subject matter, personalized medicine, diagnostics.
INTRODUCTION
It is generally acknowledged that patents play an important role in incentivizing the discovery and commercialization of important new technologies, and nowhere is this more
evident than in the pharmaceutical and biotechnology industries. But increasingly the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office
(PTO), the courts, and indeed the patent system itself, have
come under criticism for issuing patents that seem at best
inappropriate, if not just plain silly, or even detrimental to
science and innovation [1]. Patents claiming peanut butter
and jelly sandwiches [2], “combover” hairstyling techniques
[3], and methods of exercising a cat with a laser pointer [4]
have received a great deal of populist attention, but these
patents are more cause for amusement than any real policy
concern. Other questionable patents, however, particularly
those relating to non-technological “business methods", such
as strategies for investing money [5], conducting online
commerce [6] and minimizing taxes [7], have become the
source of widespread and legitimate concern, leading some
to question whether the range of potentially patentable subject matter has come to encompass innovations and discoveries better left unpatented.
In the life sciences, patents broadly encompassing the
practical application of fundamental biological discoveries,
such as human genes and genetic mutations [8], regulatory
pathways [9], and physiological correlations [10], has become quite controversial, not because these discoveries are
mundane or lack a substantial technological aspect, but
rather because of the fundamental nature of these
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discoveries. Many view these sorts of discoveries as the raw
materials for future biomedical innovation, and argue that
they should be made available to all, unencumbered by personal property rights. To a large extent these sorts of fundamental discoveries come out of university and publicly
funded research, and some argue that these discoveries in
most cases would be made, published and commercialized
regardless of the availability of patent protection, so it is
folly to unnecessarily tie these inventions up with patents.
Because many of these discoveries were made under federally funded grants, critics argue that the taxpayer has already
paid for the research, and that patents on these discoveries
translate into higher prices for consumers, effectively making them pay for the discovery twice. As a result, many argue that patents on basic biological discoveries are prone to
unnecessarily impede subsequent research and product development instead of encouraging it. Increasingly, these critics have come to question whether the scope of patentable
subject matter has become too broad in the biological context, and whether future biomedical innovation might be
better served by reining in the patent laws to exclude some
of these discoveries from patent protection, or at least limit
the scope of available patent protection.
There is a doctrine of U.S. patent law, the patenteligibility doctrine, that is intended to serve a gatekeeper role
in excluding from patent protection fundamental discoveries
and other subject matter deemed better left unpatented [11].
The criterion for patent-eligibility is deceptively straightforward, at least when expressed in the abstract. Essentially,
any man-made product or process, that is the result of active
human intervention as opposed to a product or process of
nature, is eligible for patent protection, so long as it satisfies
the other requirements of patentability such as novelty,
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nonobvious and practical usefulness [12]. On the other hand,
natural phenomena, principles of nature, abstract ideas, and
mental processes, which U.S. courts have characterized as
“fundamental principles,” are patent-ineligible, even if newly
discovered and satisfying all the other patentability requirements [13].
Although easy to state in the abstract, the test for patenteligibility can be difficult to apply to specific discoveries and
patent claims. The Supreme Court has pointed to the law of
gravity and E=mc2 as examples of patent-ineligible fundamental principles [14], but these examples provide little
meaningful guidance. After all, these are merely observed
physical relationships; neither is a product or process, so of
course they are not eligible for patent protection. At times,
the Court has stated that a patent claim is patent-ineligible if
it “wholly preempts” all practical uses a fundamental principle [15], implying that the scope of a patent claim has some
bearing on patent-eligibility, but providing little guidance as
to what it means for a patent claim to wholly preempt a fundamental principle.
In practice, it is far from clear where to draw the line
between fundamental principle and patentable invention, and
the effective range of patent-eligible subject matter has expanded and contracted over the years as the courts and PTO
have grappled with the issue. Historically, patents were
granted primarily on traditional inventions arising out of the
mechanical and chemical arts. But beginning around 1980,
the U.S. patent system embarked upon a pronounced expansion in its definition of patent-eligible subject matter,
prompted by some important Supreme Court decisions, as
discussed in more detail below, and this trend accelerated
rapidly around the turn of the 21st century. In recent years,
however, we have seen a backlash, with many critics from
the public and private sectors arguing that the threshold for
patent-eligibility needs to be raised in order to ensure that
patents fulfill their constitutional objective of encouraging
innovation rather than impeding it. The courts and PTO appear to have heard these critics, and have begun to actively
rein in the scope of patent-eligible subject matter. This reversal in the swing of the patent-eligiblity pendulum will likely
have a profound impact on the patentability of innovations
arising out of the pharmaceutical and biotechnology industries, particularly those relating to diagnostics and personalized medicine. In this article, I discuss the current status of
the patent-eligibility doctrine, how we got here, and what the
future might hold, particularly for the life science industries.
1980-2005: AN ERA OF EXPANDING PATENTELIGIBLITY
Prior to 1980, the range of subject matter generally regarded as patent-eligible was substantially more restricted to
than it is today. Patents were generally limited to inventions
arising out of conventional technologies, such as mechanics,
electronics and chemistry. The nascent biotechnology and
software industries were on the cusp of achieving substantial
commercial significance, but it was uncertain to what extent
patent law could be stretched to accommodate these new
arenas of innovation. And without some assurance of the
availability of patent protection, it was unclear how investments would be recouped, particularly in a field as capital-
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intensive and risky as biotechnology. At this point in time,
the law regarding the patent-eligibility of inventions in these
new fields of technology was not particularly encouraging.
For example, in the 1940 case of Funk Bros. Seed Co. v.
Kalo Innoculant Co., the Supreme Court invalidated a patent
claiming an inoculant comprising a novel and useful combination of naturally-occurring bacteria [16]. Even though the
patented combination of bacteria did not occur in nature, but
was only obtained as a result of human intervention, and the
combination produced synergistic benefits not found in nature, the Court nevertheless held that the discovery merely
took advantage of "manifestations of the laws of nature," and
thus constituted a patent-ineligible “natural phenomenon.”
Later, in Benson v. Gottschalk [17] and Parker v. Flook [18],
two Supreme Court decisions from the 1970s, the Court upheld PTO rejections of software patents directed to computer
programs for claiming patent-ineligible subject matter. In
reaching this conclusion, the Court found that the patents
amounted to an improper attempt to claim the algorithm underlying the program. According to the Court , these algorithms are mere abstract ideas, a type of fundamental principle, and the patent claims would have effectively preempted
all practical uses of the ideas.
Interpreted broadly, Funk Bros. could have substantially
limited the patentability of inventions arising out of biotechnology. However, in 1980 the Supreme Court charted a new
course in Diamond v. Chakrabarty, a landmark case that
opened the door to a more permissive interpretation of patent-eligibility, and at the same time set the stage for the
growth of the biotechnology industry [19]. Chakrabarty was
an appeal of a PTO decision to reject a patent claim directed
towards bacteria genetically-engineered to degrade and metabolize hydrocarbons. The bacteria were purportedly useful
for cleaning up oil spills. The PTO based its rejection on its
determination that living organisms are not patent-eligible
subject matter, a not unreasonable interpretation of decisions
like Funk Bros. But in Chakrabarty, a slim 5-4 majority of
the Supreme Court disagreed, and held that while a naturally
occurring bacterium would be unpatentable, a geneticallyengineered organism can be patentable because it is a manmade product of human intervention. In an oft-quoted passage, the Court stressed that Congress intended the realm of
potentially patentable subject matter to encompass “anything
under the sun that is made by man.” Thus, the key distinction
is human intervention; products and processes arising out of
active human invention are patent-eligible, while “laws of
nature, natural phenomena and abstract ideas” are patentineligible and free for all to use.
Chakrabarty has been widely credited for playing an
important role in the development of the biotechnology industry, particularly in the United States, by reassuring investors in biotechnology that patent protection would be available for the innovations that would hopefully result from
their investment. In view of the high costs and uncertainty
associated with the development of biotechnology products,
particularly in the early years of the industry, this reassurance was critical. Subsequent judicial and PTO decisions
have expanded upon the principle set forth in Chakrabarty,
establishing that genetically modified plants and non-human
mammals are also eligible for patent protection, as are iso-
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lated and recombinant genetic sequences and other biotechnology-based inventions [20]. In its 2001 J.E.M. decision,
for example, the Supreme Court reaffirmed its stance encouraging the patenting of biological innovations, holding
that utility patent protection is available for non-naturally
occurring and genetically modified plants, and reiterating
that the scope of patent-eligible subject matter is "extremely
broad [21]." The court emphasized that the relevant distinction in determining the patent-eligibility of biological inventions is between products of nature and man-made inventions.
In Diamond v. Diehr, decided in 1981, the Supreme
Court weighed in again on the question of patent-eligibility,
this time with respect to a software invention. In Diehr, the
Supreme Court reversed the PTO’s rejection of the patent
claiming a computer program to be used in the process of
curing rubber. The Court distinguished Benson and Flook,
noting that in those cases the computer program essentially
did little more than implement an abstract mathematical algorithm, while the patent-eligible software in Diehr was directed to a more tangible process of producing rubber. The
production of rubber looks more like traditionally patenteligible subject matter than the more abstract algorithms for
converting numbers embodied by the Benson claims. In any
event, like Chakrabarty, Diehr was a landmark decision that
represented a shift toward a more expansive view of patenteligible subject matter. It also opened the door to the patenting of computer programs and other non-traditional technologies. Taking their orders from Chakrabarty and Diehr,
the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals (the “Federal Circuit,”
is the highest patent specific court in the U.S. and bears primary responsibility for the interpretation and evolution of
patent law in this country) and PTO embarked upon a course
of pronounced and steady expansion of patent-eligible subject matter, particularly in the area of computer programs, so
that by the late 1990s patent-eligibility no longer stood as a
barrier to the protection of the vast majority of software applications of any commercial significance.
In 1998, the Federal Circuit decided State Street Bank &
Trust v. Signature Financial Group, another landmark decision in the evolution of the patent-eligibility doctrine [22].
Prior to State Street, it was generally assumed that in order to
be patent-eligible an invention must be technological in nature, and as a consequence methods of conducting business
were generally treated as patent-ineligible. However, in State
Street the Federal Circuit dispelled this notion, effectively
announcing that there is no technological requirement to
patent-eligibility, and that man-made innovations of all types
are patent-eligible, including novel business methods. The
years after State Street witnessed a progressive expansion of
patent-eligible subject matter, resulting in patents on methods of conducting business over the Internet, financial
schemes, tax planning strategies and the like, which in earlier times would have been treated as non-technological and
thus ineligible for patent protection. The new phenomenon
of widespread patenting of business methods was widely
criticized, prompting the PTO and Congress to institute practices and enact laws specifically restricting business method
patents. For example, the PTO applies a more rigorous examination process to patent applications directed towards
what it deems to be methods of doing business [23]. Con-
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gress has limited the ability of the holders of business
method patents to assert these patents against prior users of
the patented method [24].
Although the bulk of the criticism against the expansion
of patent-eligible subject matter post-State Street has focused
upon business method, financial and Internet patents, the
expansion has also been experienced in the life sciences,
where it has generated its share of criticism and calls for
reform that would raise the bar of patent-eligibility. One aspect of biotechnology patent practice that has caused an inordinate amount of controversy has been the patenting of
inventions arising out of the discovery of naturally occurring
genetic sequences [25]. These patents are often referred to as
"gene patents," although this is something of a misnomer,
since in fact the law is very clear that a gene as it exists in
nature, e.g., a naturally occurring gene residing in a human
body, is not patentable [26]. However, an isolated polynucleotide identical in sequence to a naturally occurring genomic sequence, or a cDNA corresponding in sequence to a
naturally occurring mRNA, can be patented. Likewise, recombinant genetic constructs and genetically engineered
biological organisms, as well as methods of using a recombinant polynucleotide corresponding sequence to naturally
occurring gene, are routinely the subject of patent protection.
Note that the line between naturally occurring genes, which
are indisputably patent-ineligible, and patent-eligible isolated
or synthetic polynucleotides and genetic constructs, is human
intervention. This is precisely the distinction the Supreme
Court made in concluding that the genetically engineered
bacteria in Chakrabarty is patent-eligible, while the combination of naturally occurring bacteria in Funk Brothers was
found to constitute a patent-ineligible natural phenomenon.
Although the patenting of isolated genes is a fairly recent
phenomenon, U.S. patent law has a long tradition of permitting the patenting of naturally occurring biological molecules
in an isolated state, purified from the biological context in
which they naturally occur. For example, in the seminal decision of Parke-Davis & Co. v. H.K. Mulford & Co., a court
held that highly purified human adrenaline was patentable,
because even though adrenaline is a natural product, in its
natural state it only occurs in small quantities intermixed
with the rest of the cellular milieu [27]. The court noted that
by purifying the adrenaline the inventor had for all practical
purposes created a chemical product that did not exist in nature, and which provided significant therapeutic benefits that
cannot be obtained using naturally occurring adrenaline. This
principle has been extended to isolated polynucleotides, proteins and other biomolecules, and is the doctrinal basis for
many of the gene patents that have been issued over the last
30 years [28].
In the early days of gene patenting, many argued that
genes are of such fundamental nature it would be a grave
mistake to allow them to be patented. Some argued that gene
patents would impede subsequent biomedical research, or
restrict patient access to important gene-based treatments,
while others simply found the concept of patenting the building blocks of life to be immoral. Nevertheless, the patenting
of isolated or recombinant versions of naturally occurring
genetic sequences has become common, first in the U.S., and
eventually in other parts of the world such as Europe. For the
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most part, the fears that have been expressed by critics of
gene patents do not appear to have come to pass, although
there are still many who would prefer to see the patenting of
DNA abolished, or least the imposition of restraints on the
ability of gene patent owners to enforce such patents [26].
Furthermore, with the rising importance of genetic diagnostic testing, particularly multiplex testing simultaneously
checking for mutations in multiple genes, there is still substantial concern that gene patents might ultimately prove to
be an impediment to the development of, and access to, sophisticated genetic testing procedures [29].
Aside from gene patents, there are a host of other patents
relating to pharmaceuticals and biotechnology that some
would argue overstep the boundary between patentable invention and unpatentable natural phenomena. For example,
based on their discovery of the important transcription factor
NF-B and its role in regulating gene expression, researchers
at Harvard, MIT, and the Whitehead Institute succeeded in
broadly patenting methods of inhibiting NF-B activity, and
have proceeded to sue pharmaceutical companies for patent
infringement, alleging that the mechanism of action of certain blockbuster drugs involves inhibition of this ubiquitous
regulatory pathway [30]. As discussed below, to date the
universities have not prevailed in these actions, but nevertheless they have compelled drug companies to expend considerable sums defending themselves. Similarly, researchers at
the University of Wisconsin developed a methodology for
maintaining primate embryonic stem cells in culture, and
based on this discovery were able to obtain patents broadly
claiming cultured primate embryonic stem cells [31]. The
university then aggressively asserted the patent to restrict
access to embryonic stem cells, although in response to
widespread criticism they later announced the adoption of
more liberal licensing policies with respect to the patented
technology [32].
In another high-profile case, researchers at the University
of Colorado discovered that an elevated level of total homocysteine is correlated with the presence of a vitamin B deficiency, and obtained a patent broadly claiming any method
of diagnosing for vitamin B deficiency that involves assaying for total homocysteine. The patent was then successfully
used to sue a diagnostic company for performing an independently developed total homocysteine assay as a service
for doctors. The court accepted a rather convoluted argument
that doctors infringed the patent by ordering a homocysteine
test for a patient and, based on an observation of elevated
total homocysteine, diagnosed a vitamin B deficiency, and
that the diagnostic company performing the assay was liable
for inducing the doctor’s infringement [33].
In another example, a doctor discovered that by altering
vaccination schedule the risk of developing an immune disorder could be reduced, and broadly patented methods of
comparing alternate vaccine schedules to determine which
one is least likely to lead to the disorder [34]. The doctor
then proceeded to sue various manufacturers and distributors
of vaccines, including major drug companies, whom he alleged infringe the patents by participating in post-approval
vaccination safety studies [35]. As discussed below, the Federal Circuit recently invalidated these patents [36]. In another
case, a doctor discovered an association between a woman’s
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maternal serum level of free beta human chorionic gonadotropin (hCG) and gestational age and the woman's risk
of carrying a fetus with Down syndrome, and obtained patents broadly claiming use of the method to screen for women
at risk of carrying a fetus with Down syndrome [37]. The
doctor then proceeded to sue a medical screening laboratory
for performing prenatal screening that allegedly infringed his
patents [38].
In yet another highly publicized case, University of
Rochester researchers discovered the prostaglandin H synthase-2 (PGHS-2) (also referred to as COX-2) pathway, and
obtained a patent broadly claiming methods of selectively
inhibiting COX-2 by administration of a non-steroidal compound [39]. The patent failed to identify any non-steroidal
compound that would function as an effective COX-2 specific inhibitor, but nonetheless effectively encompassed the
use of any subsequently developed COX-2 specific nonsteroidal anti-inflammatory drug. When Pfizer succeeded in
bringing two COX-2 inhibitors to market, BEXTRA and
CELEBREX, the university sued for patent infringement.
The Federal Circuit ultimately invalidated the university's
patent, but the case raised the issue of whether the university
overstepped in attempting to broadly and preemptively patent the practical application of an important fundamental
scientific discovery.
Other examples of issued U.S. patents that some would
argue come close to crossing the line between patentable
invention and patent ineligible fundamental principle include
a patent that broadly claims the use of the three dimensional
crystal structure of a fluorescent protein to rationally engineer a mutant with altered fluorescent properties [40], another that essentially claims computer readable data representing a naturally occurring genetic sequence [41], and a
third that broadly claims methods for diagnosing the presence of a polymorphism in the human KCNE1 gene [8].
These sorts of patents can raise conflicting concerns for
pharmaceutical companies. On one hand, they can be detrimental, particularly in cases where they are asserted against
the drug company for selling a drug that was created with
little or no input from the patent owner, or when a pharmaceutical company is sued for conducting post-approval studies of a vaccine, or for using a patented naturally occurring
genetic sequence or protein as a research tool in early stage
drug discovery. On the other hand, there is a trend towards
increased integration of diagnostic testing and drugs, often
referred to as personalized medicine, and a more stringent
application of the patent-eligibility doctrine might effectively
preclude patent protection these sorts of innovations.
Clearly, a proper balance is necessary in order to optimize
the role of patents in incentivizing the discovery, development and commercialization of new and innovative medicinal products.
LABCORP V. METABOLITE
In 2005, amidst a growing chorus of critics of the patent
system who argued that the bounds of patent-eligible subject
matter had grown far too expansive, resulting in a patent
system that too often impedes rather than incentivizes innovation, the Supreme Court entered the debate by agreeing to
hear LabCorp v. Metabolite, a case involving the patent-
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eligibility of a diagnostic method [42]. Although the Court
ultimately declined to decide the case, the mere fact that it
took the case at all was significant, since it signaled that at
least some of the Justices on the Supreme Court thought this
was an issue meriting their consideration. The Supreme
Court has the discretion to decide whether or not it wants to
hear a case, and will only hear a case that it thinks is highly
important, usually in an attempt to clarify a legal question of
substantial policy significance. As a consequence, the Court
only hears a small fraction of the cases referred to it, and
years go by without the Court hearing a single patent case,
although in the past few years the Court has become increasingly active in the area of patents. In retrospect, it is clear
that LabCorp teed up the issue of patent-eligibility for serious reconsideration for the first time in many years. The repercussions have already been felt, and will continue to be
felt for the foreseeable future.
LabCorp traces its origin to the discovery by doctors at
University Colorado of a correlation between high levels of
total homocysteine in the blood and a vitamin B deficiency.
These researchers also developed an accurate method of assaying for free homocysteine, using gas chromatography and
mass spectrometry. In combination, these two discoveries
provided doctors with an improved method for diagnosing
and treating patients suffering from a vitamin B deficiency.
Not surprisingly, the researchers applied for and were issued
a patent claiming their new method of assaying for total homocysteine, conventional process claims raising no issues of
patent-eligibility [10]. But the patent they received also included a claim (referred to as "Claim 13") that purports to
effectively encompass any use of the correlation to diagnose
a vitamin B deficiency. In particular, Claim 13 appears on its
face to be infringed by anyone (e.g., a doctor) that tests a
patient's body fluid for total homocysteine, and then correlates the observation of elevated total homocysteine with a
vitamin B deficiency. Significantly, Claim 13 is not limited
to the specific homocysteine assay developed by these researchers, but can be infringed by the use of any total homocysteine assay, as long as the result of the assay is used to
diagnose for a vitamin B deficiency.
Ultimately, the university's patent was licensed to Metabolite Laboratories, which in turn sublicensed it to LabCorp. LabCorp performed the patented homocysteine assay
method as a commercial service for doctors, while paying
royalties to Metabolite for the use of the assay. In 1998,
however, LabCorp switched to a different homocysteine assay (the “Abbott test”), discontinued use of the Metabolite’s
patented assay, and refused to make royalty payments to
Metabolite for homocysteine assays performed using the
Abbott test. In response, Metabolite sued LabCorp, arguing
that regardless of what homocysteine test LabCorp performed, when a doctor used the results of the test to diagnose
a vitamin B deficiency in a patient that doctor infringed
Claim 13. Metabolite did not sue the doctors, but did hold
LabCorp responsible for inducing the doctor’s infringement,
and sued under a theory of indirect patent infringement. A
jury agreed, deciding in favor of Metabolite, and on appeal
the decision was affirmed by the Federal Circuit [43]. Significantly, during the course of the litigation, through the
appeal to the Federal Circuit, LabCorp never raised the issue
of patent-eligibility with respect to claim 13.
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After losing at the Federal Circuit, LabCorp petitioned
the U.S. Supreme Court to hear the case. In its petition,
LabCorp raised a laundry list of objections to the Federal
Circuit's decision, essentially arguing that doctors did not
infringe Claim 13, or that if they did LabCorp was not responsible for the doctor's infringement, and that in any event
Claim 13 was invalid for violating multiple rules of patentability, such as failure to enable the claims, inadequate
written description of the invention, and indefinite claim
language. But buried at the end of its petition, in what appears to almost be an afterthought, LabCorp pointed out that
Claim 13 effectively covers the mental processes of a doctor
who orders the test and recognizes the correlation between
total homocysteine and vitamin B deficiency (a “scientific
fact”), without requiring a doctor to physically do anything.
While not explicitly invoking the patent-eligibility doctrine,
these references to mental processes and scientific fact nonetheless clearly implicate patent-eligibility.
In retrospect, it might seem surprising that LabCorp did
not focus more of its argument explicitly on the issue of patent-eligibility, and did not even bring the issue up in the
lower courts. But at the time, after years of expansion in the
scope of patent-eligible subject matter, the patent-eligibility
doctrine had for the most part come to be viewed as imposing little meaningful limitation on patentability, and LabCorp's attorneys apparently did not view it as a viable basis
for challenging Claim 13. Nonetheless, at least some of the
Justices on the Supreme Court were troubled by Claim 13,
and more generally claims like it, and saw patent-eligibility
as an appropriate legal tool for excluding these sorts of fundamental discoveries from broad patent protection. These
Justices voted to take the case, specifically to consider the
patent-eligibility of Claim 13, a surprising move in view of
the fact that the question of patent-eligibility had never been
raised in the earlier proceedings - normally, the Supreme
Court only reviews the decisions of lower courts, and does
not address issues that were not previously raised in a lower
court.
Ultimately, however, the fact that the lower courts had
not addressed the issue of patent-eligibility appears to have
been the appeal’s undoing. After the parties had fully briefed
the issue for the Court, and orally argued the case before the
Justices, the Court changed its mind, deciding that its earlier
decision to hear the case had been "improvidently granted,"
and dismissed the appeal without deciding it [42]. Apparently, a majority of the Justices decided that it would be inappropriate to rule on the issue of patentable subject matter
when the issue had not been directly addressed in the lower
courts. This was probably a good decision. Any significant
change in the doctrine of patent-eligibility could have had
sweeping unintended consequences for other inventions,
particularly in other areas of technology.
Nevertheless, a vocal minority comprising three of the
Court's nine Justices dissented from the majority's decision
not to decide the case. In a strongly worded dissenting opinion authored by Justice Breyer, these Justices voiced strong
concerns regarding the policy implications of Claim 13, and
appeared eager to decide the case regardless of whether the
issue was argued in the lower courts [42]. These Justices
argued that the case was not even close. In their view, Claim

1942 Current Topics in Medicinal Chemistry, 2010, Vol. 10, No. 18

13 clearly encompasses a natural phenomenon (the correlation between total homocysteine and vitamin B deficiency)
and is thus patent-ineligible. Moreover, it was clear from the
tenor of Justice Breyer’s opinion that these Justices were
generally concerned that the lower courts and PTO were
applying an overly permissive interpretation of the patenteligibility doctrine, which had resulted in a proliferation of
too many patents broadly claiming fundamental principles
and that threatened to impede science and innovation. While
acknowledging that patents can encourage research by providing monetary incentives for innovation, he charged that
patents can also "discourage research by impeding the free
exchange of information and raising the cost of using patented information.” He characterized the patent-eligibility
doctrine, and particularly the prohibition against the patenting of natural phenomena and fundamental scientific principles, as an important tool for screening out discoveries better
left unpatented. He also opined that there is currently much
legal uncertainty with respect to patent-eligibility, and that
the issue affects a "substantial number of patent claims.”
LabCorp, even though never expressly decided by the
Supreme Court, was to have a profound influence on patent
law, revitalizing a legal doctrine that had become largely
moribund in recent years. After LabCorp put the issue front
and center, patent attorneys have became emboldened to
raise the issue of patent-eligibility when challenging the validity of a patent. In particular, the issue of patent-eligibility
has been raised by defendants accused of infringement in
three cases involving pharmaceuticals and pharmaceutical
research: Ariad v. Eli Lilly [44], Classen v. Biogen [45] and
Prometheus v. Mayo [46]. A district court rejected the argument in Ariad, but in Classen and Prometheus the judge
sided with the defendants and held that the patents were invalid for claiming patent ineligible natural phenomena or
mental processes. The Classen decision was recently affirmed by the Federal Circuit on appeal. More recently, the
Ariad was decided by the Federal Circuit in a manner that
invalidated the claims on alternate grounds, thus avoiding
addressing the issue of patent-eligibility [47]. The Prometheus appeal is probably the most important for biotechnology and pharmaceutical industry, but has not been decided as
of the time this article was written. These cases provide a
useful insight into how the patent-eligibility doctrine will
play out in the pharmaceutical and biotechnology sector, and
it is useful to consider the facts of these cases in more detail.
ARIAD V. ELI LILLY
The patent at issue in Ariad v. Eli Lilly arose out of the
discovery of the transcription factor NF-B by researchers at
MIT, the Whitehead Institute, and Harvard University, and
the critical role the NF-B pathway plays in regulating gene
expression in a variety of contexts. A patent application was
filed on behalf of the researchers in the mid-1980s, and after
a “16 year trek through the [PTO],” during which time the
claims were repeatedly rejected for being overly broad, this
fundamental discovery ultimately resulted in a patent with
claims that appear on their face to be extremely broad, essentially claiming methods of inhibiting NF-B-mediated intracellular signaling activity in eukaryotic cells [9]. The patent
was assigned to Ariad, a private company, which joined with
the universities in demanding licensing fees from pharma-
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ceutical companies such as Eli Lilly and Amgen that sold
drugs whose mechanism of action purportedly involves inhibition of NF-B activity. Significantly, there is no indication
that the discovery of the NF-B pathway played any direct
role in the development of the allegedly infringing drugs. In
fact, Lilly applied for patents on its two allegedly infringing
drugs, raloxifine (Evista) and drotrecogin alfa (Xigris), before the university researchers even discovered NF-B. Eli
Lilly refused to pay, and Ariad and the universities sued for
patent infringement. In 2006 a jury found that Eli Lilly’s sale
of these drugs infringed the patent, and awarded Ariad and
the universities $65 million in back royalties and 2.3 percent
royalty on future U.S. sales [48].
Subsequent to the jury decision, and shortly after the U.S.
Supreme Court agreed to hear LabCorp, Lilly went back to
the district judge hearing the case and asked him to invalidate Ariad’s patent for claiming patent ineligible subject
matter. In particular, Lilly argued that Ariad's patent claims
encompass NF-B regulation that occurs naturally in cells,
and thus impermissibly pre-empts all use of a natural phenomenon. As was the case with Metabolite’s patent, Ariad’s
patent seems to broadly cover any practical application of a
fundamental biological discovery. The NF-B pathway is
ubiquitous, and likely involved with the mechanisms of action of many drugs. From Lilly's perspective, the infringement is entirely inadvertent, since they began developing the
allegedly infringing drugs without any knowledge of the
discovery of NF-B. Nevertheless, the judge rejected their
patent-eligibility argument, finding that Lilly had failed to
provide sufficient evidence to prove that NK-B inhibition
actually occurs naturally.
Part of Lilly’s problem might have stemmed from its
difficulty in overcoming a fairly strong presumption under
U.S. law that an issued U.S. patent is valid. Lilly’s case was
also hindered by procedural issues; the judge refused to consider some of the evidence submitted by Lilly in support of
its argument that the regulation of NF-B occurs naturally in
cells. Perhaps as a consequence of these procedural and evidentiary hurdles, Lilly failed to persuade the judge that NFB inhibition exists in living cells in a way that is encompassed by Ariad's claims. On appeal, the Federal Circuit invalidated Ariad’s claims on alternate grounds, thereby avoiding the issue of patent-eligibility, as discussed in more detail
below.
CLASSEN V. BIOGEN
Classen v. Biogen arose out of a doctor’s discovery of a
relationship between vaccination schedule (the timing of the
administration of a series of vaccinations) and the likelihood
that the vaccination would cause a chronic immune-mediated
disorder. Based on his discovery, Dr. Classen obtained patents broadly claiming methods of comparing alternate vaccine schedules to determine which schedule minimizes the
incidence or severity of a chronic immune-mediated disorder
[35]. The doctor then proceeded to sue various manufacturers and distributors of vaccines, including Biogen, whom he
alleged had infringed the patents by participating in postapproval vaccination safety studies. The district court held
on a motion for summary judgment that the patents were
invalid for claiming patent ineligible subject matter. The
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judge’s decision is not entirely clear as to the precise basis
for his determination that the claims are patent-ineligible, at
times asserting that the claims are invalid for claiming a
mental process, while at other times complaining that that
the claims encompass a natural phenomenon. The decision
concludes by noting that “[c]learly, the correlation between
vaccination schedules and the incidence of immune mediated
disorders that Dr. Classen claims to have discovered is a
natural phenomenon.”

1943

different outcomes are probably best explained as the result
of different evidence and arguments presented in the two
different cases, or simply divergent applications of a very
uncertain legal doctrine by two different judges.
PROMETHEUS V. MAYO
Prometheus v. Mayo involves patents directed towards a
method of using diagnostic testing to individually tailor the
dosage of a drug to the metabolism of a particular patient,
and so is an example of a personalized medicine patent. It is
widely believed that personalized medicine will play an increasingly important role in future drug treatment regimens,
so this patent litigation could be of particular significance for
the biotechnology and pharmaceutical industries. The patents
at issue arose out of the discovery that, by monitoring the
level of certain thiopurine drug metabolites in a particular
patient (6-MMP and 6-TG, as shown in Fig. 1), it is possible
to adjust drug dosage to optimize safety and efficacy for that
patient. The thiopurine drugs in question (AZA and 6-MP, as
shown in Fig. 1) were used to treat individuals with immune-

The court in Classen provided absolutely no reasoning to
support its conclusion that a correlation involving a vaccination schedule is “natural.” Clearly, immunization using human-generated vaccines is not something that occurs absent
human intervention. One could argue that a biological phenomenon that exists only as a result of human intervention,
such as vaccination, does not constitute a natural phenomenon, but the court chose not to address this issue. There
would appear to be some tension between the conclusion in
Classen that a vaccination schedule is a natural phenomenon,
while the NF-B pathway at issue in Ariad is not, but the
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mediated gastrointestinal disorders such as Crohn's disease,
but use of the drug was often accompanied by serious adverse side effects, including hepatotoxicity.
Because individuals metabolized the drug differently, it
had been difficult for doctors to ascertain the proper dosage,
and reportedly some doctors were even hesitant to prescribe
the drugs for fear of toxic side effects. Based on the discovery of a correlation between drug metabolite levels and optimal dosage, Prometheus obtained patents claiming a
method of treating individuals suffering from autoimmune
disease that essentially entails administering a thiopurine
drug to the patient, assaying for the level of certain drug metabolites (i.e., drug breakdown products), and recognizing
that if the metabolite level exceeds an upper threshold the
dosage should be decreased, while if the metabolite level is
less than a lower threshold the dosage should be adjusted
upward. Prometheus developed and marketed a diagnostic
test for assaying for the level of these thiopurine drug metabolites in a patient, for use in determining optimal drug
dosage for that individual, and licensed the technology to the
Mayo Clinic. However, Mayo eventually developed its own
thiopurine metabolite test, stopped paying licensing fees to
Prometheus, and announced that it planned to compete with
Prometheus by marketing its own test. Prometheus sued for
patent infringement, and Mayo defended by challenging the
patent-eligibility of Prometheus’ patents, arguing that the
relationship between thiopurine drug metabolite levels and
optimal drug dosage is a natural phenomenon.
Prometheus argued that since the drug metabolites only
exist in the human body as the result of human intervention
(i.e., by administration of the thiopurine drugs), the correlation cannot be considered a natural phenomenon. However,
the district court judge held that the correlation between the
level of thiopurine drug metabolites in the human body and
therapeutic efficacy and safety is a “natural phenomenon,”
and that Prometheus’ asserted claim were invalid under Section 101 for “wholly preempting” this supposed natural phenomenon. Although some would argue that a correlation
involving the interaction of a man-made drug with the human body cannot constitute a natural phenomenon, the judge
found that since thiopurine drugs “are converted naturally by
enzymes within the patient’s body to form an agent that is
therapeutically active, . . . the correlation results from a natural body process,” and is thus is an unpatentable “work of
nature.”
In other words, the court in Prometheus found that the
mere involvement of a natural process renders a correlation
that exists only as the result of human intervention an unpatentable natural phenomenon. This rationale seems questionable, for if taken to its logical extreme, it would seem that
any invention, in any area of technology, involves natural
processes at some level, and would thus be unpatentable under this test. For example, any electronic invention relies on
the fundamental nature of electrons and materials such as
silicon. Mechanical inventions rely on the law of gravity and
friction. And what biological invention does not involve
natural biological processes? Drugs and methods of using
drugs to treat illness are widely acknowledged to be patentable, but they typically interact with “natural body processes.” As discussed below, it is hoped that the Federal Cir-
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cuit will take up this issue and clarify the distinction between
natural and non-natural phenomena, particularly in the biological and pharmaceutical context.
IN RE BILKSI
LabCorp not only opened the minds of lawyers to a new
basis for challenging patent validity, it also put the PTO and
the Federal Circuit on notice that the Supreme Court was
receptive to the arguments made by those that complained
that the patent-eligibility bar had been set too low, and if the
PTO and Federal Circuit did not act to rein in the scope of
patent-eligible subject matter soon it was likely the Supreme
Court would choose to intervene in a future case. Historically, the Supreme Court has to a large degree given free rein
to the Federal Circuit to oversee the evolution of patent law,
but increasingly in recent years the Supreme Court has actively intervened, and at times rebuked the Federal Circuit
when it felt that that the lower court’s had gotten off track.
Two recent examples include KSR International v. Teleflex
[49], where the Supreme Court effectively reprimanded that
the Federal Circuit for misapplying the standard for determining whether an invention is obvious (and thus unpatentable), and eBay v. MercExchange [50], where the Court held
that the Federal Circuit had been wrong to automatically
impose an injunction in nearly every instance where patent
infringement was proven.
Apparently taking a cue from LabCorp, the PTO began
to apply the patent-eligibility doctrine more stringently, and
the Federal Circuit supported this move by affirming decisions from the PTO Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences (“the Board”) of appeals rejecting claims for encompassing patent ineligible subject matter. For example, two
important cases were In re Nuijten [51] and In re Cominskey
[52], appeals of Board decisions that were decided on the
same day. In both cases, the Federal Circuit affirmed the
PTO’s rejection of the claims as invalid for encompassing
patent ineligible subject matter. Nuijten and Cominskey were
both decided by three judge panels of the Federal Circuit,
which is typical - most appeals are decided by three judge
panels drawn from the twelve judges of the Federal Circuit.
However, when the Federal Circuit wishes to make a more
emphatic and binding statement of the law, particularly in an
area of legal uncertainty with important public policy implications, all twelve judges will come together to decide the
matter “en banc.” Because it takes into account the views of
all judges sitting on the court, an en banc decision carries
more weight than the more typical panel decisions. An en
banc decision can be viewed as a mechanism for the Federal
Circuit to make a strong, authoritative statement of the law,
and the decision must be followed by the lower courts and
by subsequent panels of the Federal Circuit.
Therefore, not surprisingly, the Federal Circuit decided to
hear a patent-eligibility case en banc, presumably to clarify
the law in this area, and hopefully set their house in order
before the Supreme Court stepped in and did it for them. The
case they chose was In re Bilski [53], another appeal from
the Board. Bilski had applied for a patent claiming, in essence, a method of hedging risk in the field of commodities
trading, a business method patent of the type of that has been
particularly targeted by critics of the expansion in patent-
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eligible subject matter since State Street. The Board had affirmed the patent examiner’s rejection of the claims, holding
that what it characterized as a “transformation” of "nonphysical financial risks and legal liabilities … is not patenteligible subject matter,” and that Bilski was impermissibly
attempting to preempt any and every possible way of implementing an abstract idea.
The en banc Federal Circuit sided with the Board, affirming that Bilski's claims are indeed patent ineligible. The decision to affirm was not surprising; this is a classic "business
method" claim, the type of claim that the public, and at least
some members of the Supreme Court, would very likely object to, and eleven of the twelve Federal Circuit judges
agreed on this point. What was surprising to many, however,
was that a nine judge majority went much further than simply invalidating the claims at issue, and joined in pronouncing a single test for patent-eligibility that apparently will be
applied from now on in assessing the patent-eligibility of all
process claims. This test has come to be referred to as the
“machine or transformation” test. Process claims are quite
common in the life sciences, so this decision has profound
implications for the pharmaceutical and biotechnology industries.
Before setting forth the machine or transformation test,
the Bilski majority (referred to hereafter simply as Bilski)
noted that, under binding Supreme Court precedent, the fundamental inquiry in assessing patent-eligibility is whether
the patent “claim recites a fundamental principle and, if so,
whether it would pre-empt substantially all uses of that fundamental principle." (emphasis added) Bilski uses the term
“fundamental principle” as shorthand for "laws of nature,
natural phenomena, [or] abstract ideas” and mental processes, categories of patent ineligible subject matter previously identified by the Supreme Court.
Note the court’s emphasis on “preemption”; a claim limited to a particular “application" of a fundamental principle
is patent-eligible, while a claim that "seek[s] to pre-empt the
use of” that fundamental principle is not. In other words, an
overly broad patent claim can be found patent ineligible if it
substantially encompasses all practical uses of a fundamental
principle. In a sense, Bilski treats patent-eligibility as a tool
for limiting claim breadth, an objective traditionally accomplished by means of other patent law doctrines, particularly
the enablement and written description requirements.
But after articulating the fundamental test as hinging on
preemption, Bilski goes on to explain that in practice it is
hardly straightforward for a court to determine whether a
given claim would preempt all uses of the fundamental principle. So, in order to assist the courts and PTO in making this
determination, Bilski articulates a more definitive test to determine whether a process claim is tailored narrowly enough
to encompass only a particular application of a fundamental
principle, rather than to preempt the principle itself. Under
this “machine or transformation” test, a claimed process is
patent-eligible only if it satisfies one of two criteria: (1) it is
tied to a particular machine or apparatus, or (2) it transforms
a particular article into a different state or thing. According
to Bilski, this is the only applicable test and “must be applied
. . . when evaluating the patent-eligibility of [any process
claim].” In other words, the test appears to apply to process
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claims in the areas of biology and chemistry to the same extent as business methods. Bilski does not rule out the possibility that at some point in the future the Federal Circuit may
refine or augment the test or its application, but the court did
make clear that for the time being this is the sole governing
test of patent-eligibility for process claims.
Furthermore, Bilski emphasizes that it is not enough that
a patent claim merely involves the use of a particular machine, or the transformation of an article. The involvement of
the machine or transformation must be central to the claimed
process, constituting more than what the Court refers to as
mere "insignificant extra solution activity.” In other words,
the machine or transformation must impose meaningful limits on the claim’s scope. Bilski provides several examples of
"insignificant extra solution activity." For example, the inclusion of a data-gathering step to a claim primarily directed
towards a fundamental principle, such as a natural phenomenon or algorithm, will generally be insufficient to render the
claim patent-eligible, even if the data-gathering step involves
a machine or transformation. In effect, the data-gathering
step will be disregarded in the analysis as "insignificant extra
solution activity."
Bilski points with approval to an earlier judicial decision
where a process of performing a clinical test and, based on
the data from that test, determining if an abnormality existed,
was held to be patent ineligible because, in essence, the
claim was merely directed towards an algorithm combined
with an insignificant data-gathering step. The court pointed
out that every algorithm inherently requires the gathering of
data inputs, and the mere inclusion of a general datagathering step is insufficient to confer patentability on an
otherwise unpatentable algorithm. At the same time, the
court recognized that in some cases the recitation of a specific data-gathering process might be significant and sufficient to confer patent-eligibility on the claim. Again, it
should be noted that the patent-eligibility doctrine is being
used in Bilski as a mechanism to limit claim scope; a claim
to an algorithm coupled with a general data-gathering step is
generally unpatentable, but if the data-gathering step is limited to some specific methodology or reagents, the datagathering step could be treated as substantial, and the claim
treated as patent-eligible.
Bilski also provided some guidance with respect to what
sorts of “transformations” would satisfy the test. For example, the court stated that a process for a chemical or physical
transformation of physical objects or substances is clearly
patent-eligible subject matter under the test. Furthermore, the
transformation of data representing physical and tangible
objects, such as “bones, organs and other body tissues” will
also generally render a process patent-eligible. In contrast, a
transformation of mere generalized data, not tied to any specific physical object, will generally not satisfy the test. In
particular, transformations of “legal obligations or relationships, business risks, other such abstractions cannot meet the
test because they're not physical objects or substances and
they are not representative of physical objects or substances.”
Three of the Federal Circuit judges disagreed strenuously
with the majority’s decision to establish the machine or
transformation test as the sole governing test for patent-
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eligibility of process claims. For example, Judge Newman
pointed out that the test would exclude from patentability
many of today's most important innovations, particularly in
the growth industries of the U.S. economy, such as the computer and information service fields, which she saw as detrimental to U.S. competitiveness. Judge Mayer agreed that
Bilski's claim was patent ineligible, but his approach would
have been to simply classify all business method patents as
patent ineligible. The machine or transformation test, he argued, will prove to be easily circumvented by clever drafting
of patent claims, and in his view does too little to stem the
growth of patents on non-technological methods and ideas.
He also predicted that the machine or transformation test
would prove exceedingly difficult to apply in practice, and
will only lead to further uncertainty regarding the scope of
patentable subject matter. Judge Mayer explicitly voiced his
support for patents on pharmaceuticals, finding that the high
cost of drug innovation justifies the award of a patent.
Finally, Judge Rader would have also found Bilski's
claim to be patent ineligible for claiming what he characterized as an abstract idea, and challenged the wisdom of establishing the machine or transformation test as the sole means
of assessing the patent-eligibility of all processes. He argued
that the preferable and proper approach is to focus on
whether the claim is directed towards a natural phenomenon,
mental process or abstract idea. In particular, he argued that
the patent claim at issue in LabCorp, Metabolite’s Claim 13,
is patent-eligible because the claimed process applies the
relationship between high homocysteine levels and vitamin
B deficiencies to achieve a useful, tangible, and concrete
result - the diagnosis of a potentially serious condition in
patients. He pointed out that the method of Claim 13 provides an elegant and simple way of testing for a vitamin deficiency, and argued that such life-saving innovations in the
diagnostic field should be incentivized by the availability of
patent protection. He goes on to predict that denying patent
protection for this sort of innovation will undermine and
discourage future research for diagnostic tools, and warns
that the machine or transformation test “inadvertently advises investors that they should divert their unprotectable
investments away from discovery of scientific relationships
within the body to diagnose breast cancer or Lou Gehrig's
disease or Parkinson's or whatever."
IMPLICATIONS
SCIENCES

OF

BILSKI

FOR

THE

LIFE

Will Judge Rader’s dire prognosis of the impact of the
Bilski machine or transformation test on certain types of
biomedical research prove to be correct? It is much too early
to say, but it is nonetheless prudent to consider some of the
potential implications for the life sciences industry, particularly with respect to diagnostic testing and personalized
medicine. First off, it is important to bear in mind that the
Bilski machine or transformation test only applies to process
claims, and so claims directed to products, such as drugs and
drug formulations, polynucleotides, genetically engineered
organisms, embryonic stems cells, diagnostic testing kits and
the like should not be directly impacted by Bilski, although
some of the principles articulated in Bilski might be applied
by the courts when assessing the patent-eligibility of such
product claims. Clearly, a product claim can be found patent
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ineligible, as illustrated by the decision in Funk Brothers
invalidating claims to an inoculant (essentially a combination of bacteria), and claims directed towards naturally occurring molecules, such as genes or proteins in their native
state, are beyond question patent ineligible subject matter.
With respect to process claims, Bilski appears quite emphatic that the machine or transformation test is, at least for
the time being, the one and only general test for patentability
of process claims, regardless of the nature of the process or
the field of technology. But substantial uncertainty remains
as to how the test will be applied, particularly outside the
realm of business method patents from which the test arose.
For example, the Bilski test requires the use of a “particular”
machine or apparatus, or the transformation of a “particular”
article. But how specific does the patent claim have to be
with respect to a “particular” machine, apparatus, or article
in order to satisfy the test? For example, will the use of a
general computer be sufficient? Clearly, the machine or
transformation test will function as a means for limiting the
scope of patent protection, but the extent is unclear. For example, most diagnostic methods involve a gathering of data,
which generally implies the use of some machine or apparatus and/or the transformation of some substance, e.g., a
chemical transformation. Will that be sufficient to satisfy the
test, or will the claim need to be limited with more particularly toward some specific machine, apparatus or transformation?
Perhaps the most significant issue implicated by the Bilski test, particularly with respect to diagnostic methods, will
be the manner in which future courts decide whether a process step amounts to mere “insignificant extra-solution activity.” In particular, the court was fairly explicit in its statement that, in general, a data-gathering step will generally not
be sufficient to confer patent-eligibility, regardless of
whether it involves a machine or transformation, if data
gathering is inherent in carrying out a claimed algorithm, or
for that matter any process that can be performed mentally
(such as recognizing a biological correlation). Bilski strongly
implies that the step of assaying for total homocysteine in
Metabolite’s Claim 13 constituted insignificant extrasolution activity, which would seem to render the claim patent ineligible. Once the assaying step is disregarded, the
claim is merely directed towards the recognition of a correlation between total homocysteine and a vitamin B deficiency,
which could be characterized as either an algorithm or mental process - in either event the result is apparently the same,
patent ineligibility.
In fact, a Federal Circuit panel has already decided a case
involving a data-gathering step coupled to what might be
characterized as a biological correlation, Classen v. Biogen
(discussed above), and implicitly seems to have treated the
data-gathering step as insubstantial extra-solution activity.
Shortly after Bilski was decided, the Federal Circuit affirmed
the lower court’s decision invalidating Dr. Classen’s claims
[54]. In a terse, unpublished opinion (and thus not binding on
subsequent decisions of the Federal Circuit and lower
courts), the Federal Circuit did not comment upon the district
court’s rationale for invalidating the patents, but simply concluded that the claims were patent ineligible for failure to
satisfy the machine or transformation test, because the
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claimed processes are neither “tied to a particular machine or
apparatus” nor do they ‘transform[] a particular article into a
different state or thing.’ In fact, the claims involve an immunization step, which clearly results in a transformation of the
individual that was immunized. The Federal Circuit provides
no explanation of the rationale it used as the basis for its decision, but it seems apparent that it must have concluded that
the immunization step is merely a “data-gathering step,”
inherent to the practical implementation of an abstract idea
or algorithm for optimizing an immunization schedule, and
thus not central to the claim- in other words, mere “insubstantial extra-solution activity.”
While the district court’s decision in Classen was based,
at least in part, upon its characterization of the relationship
between immunization schedule and autoimmune disorder as
a natural phenomenon, the Federal Circuit never addresses
this issue in reaching its decision. As discussed below, the
machine or transformation test seems better suited for dealing with claims that preempt abstract ideas, algorithms, or
mental processes, the context from which the test arose, but
largely inappropriate for cases where the fundamental problem with the patent claim is that it preempts a principle of
nature or natural phenomenon. It is important to recognize
that the machine or transformation test does not entail any
inquiry into the specific nature of the fundamental principle,
even though the test is meant to act as merely as a proxy for
the ultimate determination of whether the claim preempts a
fundamental principle.
Note that under the approach applied by the Federal Circuit in Classen, Metabolite’s Claim 13 would likely also
have been found invalid, since it appears to merely involve
an algorithm or mental process (diagnosing a vitamin B deficiency based on elevated total homocysteine) coupled with a
data-gathering step (assaying for total homocysteine) inherent to the algorithm. The Bilski majority also strongly suggested that under the machine or transformation test Claim
13 would be found patent ineligible. Classen does not bode
well for a host of issued patents, particularly genetic diagnostic method claims which purport to broadly encompass
any method of identifying a mutation, and could substantially limit the available patent protection for innovations in
personalized medicine.
Prometheus might likewise not fare well in a post-Bilski
world. Recall that the district court found the claims patent
ineligible for wholly preempting a natural phenomenon. The
logic supporting that conclusion seems doubtful at best,
since the purported natural phenomenon is a correlation between the levels of a drug breakdown product in a patient’s
body and optimal dosage of the drug. This correlation arises
solely as a consequence of the introduction of a nonnaturally occurring, man-made drug into a patient’s body,
and it seems eminently wrong to classify this as a “natural
phenomenon.” To hold otherwise could establish dangerous
precedent, because if followed to its logical conclusion it
implies that any interaction of a drug with the human body is
a natural phenomenon, which would presumably render
broad claims directed to drugs and methods of drug treatment patent ineligible. But the Federal Circuit might very
well never even address the “natural phenomenon” issue in
future cases, if it proceeds to simply apply the Bilski ma-
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chine or transformation test to Prometheus in the same reflexive manner employed in Classen.
Applying the machine or transformation test to the claims
at issue in Prometheus, the Federal Circuit might have very
well found the claims to be patent-ineligible. The claims
recite the administration of the drug to a patient and determining the level of metabolite in the patient's body, but under Bilski these might well be treated as insignificant extra
solution data-gathering steps. The only other steps in the
claimed process are to gather data by observing the level of a
drug metabolite in a patient, and based on that extra solution
observation “be warned” that an adjustment in dosage may
be required, neither of which appears to involve a machine or
transformation sufficient to satisfy the Bilski test.
Prometheus and Classen illustrate an important point
regarding the machine or transformation test; compliance
with the test has little if anything to do with whether or not
the claimed invention preempts a principle of nature or natural phenomenon, even though the Federal Circuit bases the
test on its assertion that the involvement of the machine or
transformation serves as a proxy for the ultimate question of
whether a fundamental principle has been preempted. For
example, while the district court in Classen based its decision at least in part on its conclusion that the claims preempt
a natural phenomenon, the reason the claims failed the machine or transformation test on appeal to the Federal Circuit
appears to have nothing to do with whether or not claims
preempt a natural phenomenon.
Likewise, in Prometheus the district court's decision was
based on preemption of a natural phenomenon, but if the
Federal Circuit applies the Bilski machine or transformation
test in deciding the case on appeal, the case will likely be
decided based on whether the court finds the steps of administering a drug to a subject and determining the level of drug
metabolite in the subject involve a “particular machine or
apparatus,” or a “transformation,” that constitutes “significant extra-solution activity." The identification of a natural
phenomenon, and the determination of whether that phenomenon has been wholly preempted, appears to play no role
in the analysis under the Bilski test. In my opinion, the machine or transformation test seems designed to weed out patents that preempt abstract ideas, algorithms and mental processes, i.e., the types of subject matter claimed in business
method patents; it seems ill-suited for analyzing whether or
not a claim wholly preempts other categories of patent ineligible fundamental principles, particularly natural phenomena
and principles in nature.
The inadequacy of the machine or transformation test in
the context of a patent claim broadly encompassing a biological natural phenomenon is perhaps best exemplified by
Ariad's NF-B patent. One of Ariad’s claims, for example,
recites "[a] method for reducing, in eukaryotic cells, the level
of expression of genes which are activated by extracellular
influences which induce NF-B -mediated intracellular signaling, the method comprising reducing NF-B activity in
the cells such that expression of said genes is reduced [55].”
The claimed method seems clearly to involve a significant
transformation, i.e., a reduction of NF-B activity that results
in reduced levels of gene expression will clearly transform
the nature of the cell, as well as the organism. The whole
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point of the claim is that a reduction of NF-B activity will
affect physiological transformations, which is why the NFB signaling pathway is involved in the mechanism of action
of Lilly's drugs. Bilski explicitly states that a chemical transformation will render a claim patent-eligible under the test,
and reduced NF-B activity will clearly alter the biochemical
makeup of the cell and organism. Furthermore, this transformation cannot be disregarded as “insignificant extra solution activity,” because it constitutes the entire claimed process. The claim thus would appear to survive a literal application of the machine or transformation test, regardless of the
extent to which it might preempt a natural phenomenon.
In my view, the machine or transformation test just does
not work for claims, such as Ariad's, that at least implicate
the preemption of a biological natural phenomenon. For example, a hypothetical patent claim broadly encompassing
photosynthesis in a naturally-occurring plant involves a
transformation of a particular article (i.e., carbon dioxide and
water) into a different thing (sugar and oxygen), and thus
appears on its face to satisfy the machine-or-transformation
test as articulated in Bilski. But under binding Supreme
Court precedent, acknowledged by the Federal Circuit in
Bilski, the claim cannot be patentable if it wholly preempts
photosynthesis, which is clearly a natural phenomenon.
When the Federal Circuit decided Ariad, it had an opportunity to address the issue of whether the machine or transformation test truly is appropriate for all process claims, and
particularly process claims relating to biological natural phenomena. Instead, the court ducked the issue by invalidating
Ariad's claims on other grounds. But the issues raised by
application of the Bilski test to patent claims of this type will
need to be resolved at some point, and for the sake of the
industry it would be better if the court provides guidance
sooner rather than later.
Some of the most controversial biotechnology patents
relate to genetic diagnostic testing. Some of these patents
broadly claim methods of identifying mutations, with no
explicit transformation of a particular article, and not tied to
any particular machine or apparatus. For example, Myiad
Genetics has sued competitors for infringing a patent which
claims any "method for screening germline of a human subject for an alteration of a BRCA1 gene which comprises
comparing germline sequence of a BRCA1 gene . . . with
germline sequences of wild-type BRCA1 gene . . ., wherein a
difference in the sequence of the BRCA1 gene . . . of the
subject from wild-type indicates an alteration in the BRCA1
gene in said subject [56].” Similarly, DNA Sciences sued
GeneDx for allegedly infringing a patent claiming any
“method for diagnosing the presence of a polymorphism in
human KCNE1 . . . wherein said method is performed by
means which identify the presence of said polymorphism
[57]." Arguably, these sorts of claims are merely directed to
"comparing" naturally occurring genetic sequences, or "diagnosing" the presence of natural mutations, and lack the
significant extra-solution step necessary for patent-eligibility
under Bilski.
The PTO has indicated that it will find claims relating to
diagnostics and personalized medicine patent ineligible if the
claimed method is not limited to a particular machine, apparatus or transformation. For example, a PowerPoint slide
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presented by a representative of the PTO at the December 3,
2008 Biotechnology/Chemical/Pharmaceutical Customer
Partnership Meeting concludes that a patent claim recite “[a]
method for determining whether a human subject having
breast cancer will be effectively treated with ‘breast cancer
drug X’, said method comprising: a) considering data in a
database comprising genetic patient information about the
ERBB2 gene at position 101 of SEQ ID NO:1; and b) correlating the presence of a cytosine at position 101 of SEQ ID
NO:1 with effective treatment of the human subject with
‘breast cancer drug X’” is patent ineligible [58]. This interpretation of Bilski could substantially allay much of the fears
that have been expressed regarding gene patents blocking
access to life-saving diagnostic testing, but at the same time
raises concerns that future innovations in personalized medicine might not be amenable to effective patent protection.
As noted above, the patent-eligibility doctrine can be
viewed as a tool for limiting claim scope; a patent limited to
certain specified practical applications of a natural phenomenon is patent-eligible, while a broader claim wholly preempting essentially all practical uses of the phenomenon will be
denied as patent ineligible. In particular, genetic diagnostic
testing claims might be fine if limited to a specific test or
tests, but patent ineligible if drafted so broadly as to effectively encompass any method for observing a genetic variation.
In summary, Bilski clearly signals a trend toward a more
restrictive view of patent-eligible subject matter than we
have seen in recent years, and will likely have a substantial
impact on patent practice in the pharmaceutical and biotechnology industries, particularly with respect to diagnostics
and personalized medicine. But at this point in time, it is still
much too early to confidently predict where the courts and
PTO will take the doctrine as it is applied to the life sciences.
The Federal Circuit's recent decision in Classen, although
non-precedential and thus in no way binding on subsequent
courts, nonetheless suggests that patent-eligibility has become a significant issue for patentability in the life sciences.
The Federal Circuit should decide Prometheus in the not too
distant future, and hopefully will take the opportunity to clarify the patent-eligibility doctrine in a manner that promotes
innovation in the pharmaceutical and life sciences.
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